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Abstract 
This essay is about Turkey’s accession to the EU and what the main obstacles are 
for a membership. In order to become a member in the EU there are certain 
political conditions that needs to be fulfilled. Within the EU there is a 
disagreement about whether or not Turkey should join because of its failure in 
implementing these conditions. With the help of a conceptual framework dealing 
with three concepts of implementation, I have created a set of hypotheses based 
on information in scientific articles which highlights Turkey’s problems in 
becoming a member in the EU. By testing these against Swedish and Turkish 
newsarticles I have tried to come to some conclusion about why it is that Turkey 
has problems with the implementation. My analysis shows that the main obstacles 
in Turkey are powers within the country that are against reforms required for an 
EU membership. Equally important are powers in the EU, such as political leaders 
and the public that are against a Muslim country joining.  
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1 Introduction 
For many years Turkey has tried to become an integral part of Europe. Despite 
many ups and downs in the relationship between the two, Turkey has continued its 
pursuit to become a member of the European Union (EU). Most of the time 
Turkey has been related to as “the other” in Europe, because of its non-western 
culture and identity. It is however a country influenced by western values and 
norms. It now would seem that a Turkish membership in the EU is no longer 
impossible. But accession to the Union has been difficult and a Turkish 
membership is met with great ambiguity both within Europe and within Turkey.  
Two years after the establishment of the European Economic Community 
(EEC), Turkey applied for membership. In 1963 the Ankara Agreement was 
signed which made it associate member and also a possible candidate for full 
membership in 1995. This agreement awoke expectations in Turkey and started 
preparatory work in order to meet the demands for membership.  
In 1987 Turkey applied for membership in the EEC. However, the 
Commission was of the opinion that the negotiations should not be started. One of 
the obstacles was that it would lead to great economic and social obstacles for the 
country. Also, a political problem was the lack of respect for human rights in 
Turkey. However, in 1999 the Helsinki European Council granted Turkey the 
status of candidate country.  
At the Helsinki summit it was decided that the EU should assist Turkey in 
making internal political reforms. A part of this strategy was to make it able to 
fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria by creating a political dialogue with the EU. Since 
1999 and after the election of the Justice and Development party (AKP) in 2002 
Turkey has undergone political reforms, aimed at promoting democratization and 
human rights. Important in this progress have been the EU goals, which have 
framed the work and united disparate groups around the reforms. Amongst other 
things, Turkey has made amendments in its constitution, such as the allowance for 
education and radio broadcasting in Kurdish. Capital punishment has also been 
abolished in times of peace. 
However, these reforms have not been complete and there are problems when 
it comes to implementation of reforms. In Turkey there has been different 
opinions regarding the impact of the reforms and the opening of negotiations. 
Some political groups and actors mean that in order to pursue the reforms, an 
opening of negotiations is important. Others are afraid of what the reforms will 
lead to if the EU does not start the negotiations. Also, resentment among Turks 
has come to grow because the EU applies a different set of membership criteria to 
Turkey which has not been the case with previous candidate countries.  
In October 2004 the Commission recommended that the EU would start 
negotiations about membership with Turkey. However, the Commission 
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established the fact that despite the political reforms Turkey had made in order to 
fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria, there were still further measures that needed to be 
taken. The Commission recommended that the negotiations could at any time be 
put to a hold if Turkey did not meet the fundamentals of democracy and human 
rights. In October 2005 accession negotiations were opened. 
1.1 Research Purpose and Question 
Considering the wide debate today about Turkey’s accession to the EU, I find it of 
great interest to study why it is that Turkey has become such a problematic 
candidate to the EU. Not only has Turkey already undergone major reforms but 
also faces further demands from the EU, demands that has not been set for 
previous candidate countries. Since the EU focus on Turkey’s political reforms, 
the purpose with this essay is to analyse the problems Turkey have with the 
implementation of these reforms in order to meet the EUs criteria for membership.  
In order to do this I will make an analysis of implementation concepts. In 
addition I will use hypotheses based on scientific articles dealing with the Turkish 
accession to the EU. The hypotheses will be tested against my empirical material 
consisting of Turkish and Swedish news articles. The aim is to increase our 
understanding of Turkey’s problems with implementation. I hope, on the basis of 
my findings, to be able to answer the following question:  
 
Why does Turkey have problems with the implementation of the political 
reforms?  
1.2 Methodology 
In this essay I will start by doing an analysis of the concepts of implementation 
which will constitute the conceptual framework for this essay. As a researcher I 
am dependent on concepts and terms which are used within my area of research. I 
will do a study based upon previous research on the subject of implementation, 
where it is necessary to make an analysis of the concepts being used (Nuopponen 
2002: 4 - 5). It is important to define, be specific and put limits to the concept that 
is to be analyzed. It is about creating a concept that in the best way possible shows 
what is to be studied, and to explain why this concept is being used (Johannessen, 
Tufte 2003: 34).  
I will continue with constructing a set of hypotheses. Hypotheses are 
assumptions that are limited to time and space and which gain support or are 
rejected grounded on the results from the empirical research (Esaiasson et al. 
2005: 38; Johannessen, Tufte 2003: 34). I intend to form hypotheses concerning 
the problems of implementation in Turkey, based on different scientific articles. I 
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will link the hypotheses to the concepts of implementation. I will then test these 
hypotheses against news articles from Swedish and Turkish media written about 
Turkey’s problems. The aim is to see if the concepts of implementation can be of 
use when testing the hypotheses.  
The essay will also have a comparative feature as I will compare the 
arguments put forward in the Swedish and Turkish articles concerning Turkey’s 
problems with joining the EU.  
This is a qualitative study, as opposed to a quantitative. A common critique 
towards this kind of study is that it is too subjective and lack transparency 
(Bryman 2004: 269-271; Johannessen, Tufte 2003: 28). In order to prevent this I 
will present how I will go about in my research of the material being used and 
how I come to my conclusions. It can also be difficult to generalize this study and 
thereby apply it to another one. My intentions are however to make the reader 
aware of this particular case, that is, Turkey’s difficulties with becoming a 
member of the EU. However, the information presented might give an insight to 
what difficulties other candidate countries might be presented with when applying 
for membership.  
1.3 Material 
This essay is based on a variation of texts. My choice of material has been guided 
by my research problem (Wallén 1996: 45; Winter 1983: 31). My primary sources 
consist of articles from Swedish and Turkish newspapers online. I have chosen 
articles from three of the largest newspapers in Sweden; Dagens Nyheter, 
Sydsvenskan and Svenska Dagbladet. From Turkey I have chosen articles from 
three newspapers written in English. These are Today’s Zaman, Journal of 
Turkish Weekly and Turkish Daily News. I have been in contact with a Turkish 
student at Lund University who has confirmed the reliability of the Turkish news 
sources. From all of the newspapers I have chosen a variety of articles written by 
different reporters and thereby hope to get a broad overview of information which 
will help me make an unbiased analysis.  
I have also included scientific articles chosen from different scientific 
magazines and written by various authors from which I will construct my 
hypotheses. By choosing different magazines, as well as authors with both 
Turkish as well as other nationalities I hope to get a broad picture of what the 
perceptions are of Turkey’s accession to the EU.  
When conducting my research on implementation in order to create my 
conceptual framework, my focus has been on implementation concepts found in 
the research by Anders Sannerstedt1 and Jeremy Richardson2. I find that their 
                                               
1
 See Anders Sannerstedts chapter “Implementering – hur politiska beslut genomförs i praktiken” in Bo 
Rothsteins book “Politik som organisation – Förvaltningspolitikens grundproblem” (1997). Sannerstedt is 
lecturer at Lund University.  
2
 See Jeremy Richardsons chapter “Eroding EU policies – Implementation gaps, cheating and re-steering” in 
“European Union: power and policy-making” (1996). Richardson is a professor at Nuffield College in Oxford.  
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research well suits the aim of this essay. They in turn refer to several prominent 
researchers in the field of implementation; I therefore believe it is well argued in 
favour of using these as my main sources when I do my concept analysis.  
1.3.1 Delimitations 
One of the adjustments I have made in my research is to stay focused on the 
picture that the media and scientific articles present about Turkey’s accession to 
the EU. I have also focused on previous implementation research. Here I have 
found enough with material to ground my research on. It would have been 
interesting to go into more detail about the official picture of the EU and Turkey, 
but I found the access to such first hand material to be limited.  
Since Turkish is not my mother tongue I have been limited to use Turkish 
articles written in English. I am aware of that these articles; limited in language 
and number, can not represent the overall view of media. I do believe however 
that they to some extent can give an insight of how the problem is elucidated in 
Turkish media, and to whether or not I find support for my hypotheses. My choice 
of using Turkish newsarticles speaks for itself. The essay is about Turkey’s 
accession to the EU and Turkish media should therefore be covered. My choice of 
also looking at Swedish newsarticles has to do with the fact that Sweden is one of 
the few countries that accept a Turkish membership in the EU. It would have been 
interesting to look at French or German newspaper considering the fact that these 
countries are the strong opponents, but I have found myself limited by the number 
of pages in this essay.  
The time span of the Swedish and Turkish articles is 2004 – 2007 due to the 
fact that the Commission recommended the EU in 2004 to start membership 
negotiations with Turkey. I therefore consider this an interesting period to study 
concerning Turkey’s accession to the EU. When it comes to the scientific articles 
I found it necessary to widen the time span to 2001 in order to find suitable 
material for my hypothesis.  
 There are many explanations to why Turkey has problems with becoming a 
member of the EU. I have chosen to focus on the implementation of political 
reforms since this is, according to the EU, where Turkey has the most problems 
when it comes to meeting the demands for membership.  
1.4 Disposition of Essay 
In chapter two I will give an introduction to implementation, where I will analyse 
three central concepts of implementation. This will represent the conceptual 
framework for this essay.  
With the help of my concepts, I will in chapter three provide an account of a 
set of hypotheses. These are based on information presented in several scientific 
articles. The hypotheses together with the concepts will give the reader an 
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apprehension of what possible problems Turkey face with the implementation of 
the EUs membership conditions.  
In chapter four I will test the hypotheses by analysing Turkish and Swedish 
newsarticles. This chapter is structured according to my hypotheses in chapter 
three where I will first present the Turkish articles and provide an analysis. I will 
then do the same with the Swedish articles.  
In my final chapter I will present the conclusions of this essay. I will discuss 
my findings and also provide an answer to the question guiding this essay: Why 
does Turkey have problems with the implementation of the political reforms?  
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2 The Study of Implementation 
“People now appear to think that implementation should be easy; they are, 
therefore, upset when expected events do not occur or turn out badly. We would 
consider our effort a success if people began with the understanding that 
implementation, under the best of circumstances, is exceedingly difficult. They 
would, therefore, be pleasantly surprised when a few good things really happen” 
         (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973: xii – xiii) 
 
In this chapter I will start by giving a short introduction to implementation and 
implementation failure as well as the top-down and the bottom-up tradition. I will 
then present Anders Sannerstedts conditions for implementation together with 
Jeremy Richardsons view. Both Sannerstedt and Richardson present certain 
preconditions needed in order for implementation to succeed, which is also a way 
to understand possible problems with implementation. Sannerstedt has set up 
three conditions that the implementer needs to fulfil in order for the 
implementation to be successful. The implementer has to understand the decision, 
has to be able to implement it and also has to want to implement it. 
Understanding, ability and will are going to be three implementation concepts that 
I will define and analyse. Together with my own reflections this will constitute the 
conceptual framework for this essay.  
2.1 Implementation 
Implementation means “to carry out, accomplish, fulfil, produce, complete”. What 
is then being implemented is a policy, which contains both goals and means in 
order to achieve it. Implementation is related to policies responding to different 
problems in society (Hill, Hupe 2006: 3 - 5). Put simply, implementation is to 
carry out a political decision (Sannerstedt 1997: 16). It deals with questions like 
“what governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes” (Lundquist 
1991: 29).  
However, it is often the case that political decisions are not implemented in a 
way the decision makers intended (Sannerstedts 1997: 26) and we can therefore 
talk about an implementation gap or even an implementation failure (Hill, Hupe 
2006: 10). To be able to explain this problem has long been the focus of the 
literature of implementation (Sannerstedt 1997: 26).  
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2.1.1 Implementation Top-down and Bottom-up 
Within implementation there are two different views on policy analysis, the top-
down and the bottom-up tradition. Within the top-down tradition the aim is to 
analyse intentions and goals and evaluate whether or not these were reached. If 
the goals were not fulfilled, what prevented the decision to be implemented? 
(Björkemarken 1995: 72) The starting perspective for this analysis is the political 
decision taken at the highest level (Sannerstedt 1997: 22). The bottom-up 
approach aims at analysing how people try to solve problems, what their 
intentions are. Since politicians and officials have different roles and interest, 
problems with implementation are something that can be expected (Björkemarken 
1995: 93).  
With time it has been acknowledged that there is a need to synthesize the two 
traditions to be able to explain public control and its consequences. Unlike earlier, 
actors from different levels get a more central role. Policy is created and 
implemented due to these different actors and levels. It can be different political 
and administrative levels, officials enjoying some freedom of action in their work 
(so called “street-level-bureaucrats”), interest groups, organisations and/or the 
response from different target groups (Björkemarken 1995: 75). 
2.2 How to Make Implementation Succeed 
2.2.1 A Question of Ability  
It is difficult to make implementation succeed in practice due to all conditions that 
needs to be fulfilled. Seen from a bottom-up perspective, one problem may be that 
there are too many actors involved (Richardson 1996: 279). There is a great risk 
that actors do not accept the policy or the political decision (Richardson 1996: 
280; Sannerstedt 1997: 39). Also, if the chain of actors is too long the policy can 
somewhere along the line be changed either intentionally or unintentionally 
(Richardson 1997: 281). It is important that the political decision is presented in a 
way acceptable to the different actors (Sannerstedt 1997: 39). When it comes to 
the implementation of directives given to a state; such as the EUs directives to 
Turkey, it is important to have in mind what the state is composed of. The legal 
system, the political administrative system, the army, political groups and 
individuals are just a fraction of those that have to take a part in the 
implementation process and are therefore crucial if it is going to succeed or not. 
As the bottom-up approach shows, different roles and interest among actors will 
most likely lead to difficulties with the implementation. A strong political 
opposition in Turkey to political reforms will hinder or at least delay the 
implementation process.  
The structure of the implementation also needs to state who is responsible of 
what (Sannerstedt 1997: 27). States implementation agencies often have their own 
traditions and objectives. They are influenced by their organisational ideologies 
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and/or who they govern. Governments therefore may have problems with 
controlling agencies in the public administration (Richardson 281-282). 
Introducing political reforms in a country is something that will take time, 
especially where institutional traditions are deeply rooted. It is important to 
remember that institutions and organisations are run by individuals, whose 
personal opinions and experiences will influence how they implement a decision 
taken at a higher level. The implementation will also be effected by individuals 
outside the organisation; since they are in daily contact with the organisation and 
will therefore indirect have influence. A government’s ability to control these 
individuals will be the main difficulty and problem, not controlling the 
organisation per se. 
An important factor in the implementation process is the need for necessary 
resources. This counts as personnel, foremost personnel with adequate 
competence. Further there need to be enough with money and time in order to 
carry out a decision (Sannerstedt 1997: 34). A problem with EU policies are that 
they expect too much too soon or because there is a lack of recourses such as 
money. Often the EU relies on regulation rather than helping states with 
resources. Even if the EU sponsors there might also be the need of funding from 
the national government in order for the implementation to be successful 
(Richardson 1997: 280 - 281). Conditions set for a membership can imply larger 
changes and adjustments for some countries than others. It is important to keep in 
mind what prerequisites states have when it comes to the implementation of EU 
policies. For some states the EU has reasoned that a membership will help the 
country in its pursuit of higher standards, such as a stronger economy and welfare 
reforms. But with Turkey this already has to exist in order to become a member. 
National governmental funding might also be necessary. However, equally 
important is that the funding is evenly and correctly distributed among those 
agencies that are to go through with the implementation. In order to do an 
implementation analysis here it requires having a top-down perspective since it is 
the EU polices that guides the implementation process. However, a bottom-up 
approach is also necessary since the access to resources will in the end determine 
whether or not agencies will be able to go through with the reforms.  
2.2.2 To Understand the Decision 
From a rational perspective it can be expected that the objectives of a policy are 
precisely formulated and that they will not be in conflict with each other. 
However, in reality the goals of political reforms are often vague and can also 
contradict each other (Sannerstedt 1997: 28). This is often the case in the EU 
where policies are seen as “peace-treaties”, due to disagreement about what the 
EU should be. This means that policies; or goals, are relatively vague which will 
lead to difficulties in the implementation process (Richardson 1996: 278). It 
should also be brought to attention that there can be disagreement between 
member- and non-member states. This can concern different aspects but will none 
the less also lead to a failure in the implementation. It can also be the case that 
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there will not even be an implementation process due to the fact that the EU can 
not force a non member state to agree to different policies or reforms. From a top-
down perspective it therefore becomes important to analyse how the intentions 
and goals of the decision-maker (the EU) were perceived by the implementer 
(Turkey) and how they were actually implemented.  
In order for implementation to be successful the parties should fully 
understand and agree on the objectives that need to be reached. This should also 
persist throughout the implementation process (Richardson 1996: 282). It is 
important that the implementer do not misinterpret the intentions of the decision-
maker (Sannerstedt 1997: 26).  
2.2.3 To Want or Not Want? That Is the Question 
In the end however, it all comes down to if the implementer is actually willing to 
go through with a decision or not. It is important that the implementer likes the 
decision and feels motivated to realize it according to the intentions (Sannerstedt 
1997: 27). A common problem is simply that the implementer does not like the 
political decision (Sannerstedt 1997: 36). It can be the form or the content of the 
policy that is not favoured. Sometimes it is not the implementation as such that is 
not working but rather the policy being ineffective. This has to do with if the 
problem is inadequately understood or what the underlying cause is and how the 
problem is best solved (Richardson 1996: 281).  
Important in constructing a policy is to take into consideration the parties that 
are to implement it. Even if there is genuine attempt to implement EU law, 
Turkish national administration might have trouble adapting to the new Euro-
regulation (Richardson 1996: 286). Local conditions, needs and wishes as well as 
values may underlie non-compliance with political decisions (Sannerstedt 1997: 
36).  
This brings the analysis to a bottom-up perspective, where focus is put on the 
officials’ intentions. The will to implement is influenced by the parties’ values 
and opinions about how important the implementation actually is, what limits 
there are for the implementation, who is responsible for it and so on. To what 
extent there is a will to go through with the implementation depends on how the 
value of the implementation is considered as well as the value of other goals. 
When it comes to EU policies there are different political and administrative 
levels to take into consideration both within the EU as well as in Turkey that is to 
implement the decision. It might not be enough with the Turkish government’s 
approval of the membership conditions as well as willingness to go through with 
necessary reforms. Different institutions, groups as well as people need to accept 
the reforms in order for the implementation to succeed.  
Finally, there needs to be a relationship between the decision-maker and the 
implementer based on negotiation. The relationship should not be hierarchic; 
instead the parties should be seen as equals with both conflicting and also 
overlapping interest and goals (Sannerstedt 1997: 38; Richardson 1996: 290).  
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3 Hypotheses  
After having read several scientific articles I will here shortly try to conclude what 
the main problems are for a Turkish membership in the EU, according to these 
articles. Together with the concepts of implementation this will constitute the 
hypotheses. Most of the articles deal with the same issues, where the minority 
question (mainly the Kurds), a strong opposition both in Europe and in Turkey 
towards Turkey joining the EU, are the main obstacles to the implementation of 
political reforms. My hypotheses will therefore focus on these issues. Looking at 
the opposition in Turkey, my focus will be on the army. Despite the time span 
between the articles printing dates, the arguments put forward are surprisingly 
similar to each other. This chapter can also provide an insight to previous research 
about Turkey’s accession to the EU, and what the different views are on this issue.   
3.1 The Leading Opposition in the EU 
Turkey has undergone many reforms in order to tackle the problems which the EU 
sees as an obstacle to a membership. Even though the EU is aware of the 
achievements of the Turkish government, the real challenge will be to ensure a 
systematic and effective implementation of these reforms (Fittipaldi 2004: 46).  
The critique towards Turkey is based on four categories, these being economy, 
politics, culture and security. Often the arguments against a Turkish membership 
have to do with Turkey’s economic weakness and difficulties in aligning its 
culture and religion with Europe’s (Redmond 2007: 308) Seeing Turkey as a 
predominantly Muslim country it should not be accepted as a member of the 
Union, which is essentially a Christian club (Yilmaz 2003: 11). However, most 
problematic has been the political conditions relating to democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respects for minorities (Redmond 2007: 310). For the EU it 
has been important to keep Turkey close due to security reasons, but shortcomings 
in the above categories, have made the EU find Turkey unacceptable as a full 
member (Redmond 2007: 308). Instead, countries opposing the membership such 
as France, Germany and Austria have offered Turkey a privileged partnership or a 
special status instead of full membership. This would provide Turkey with free 
trade and closer integration in security and military affairs. But for Turkey this 
would not bring anything it does not already have due to its participation in the 
EU Customs Union and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and accepts 
therefore nothing else than a full membership (Phillips 2004: 86). EU policy has 
at times been unclear, ambiguous and misleading which has led to high 
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expectations in Turkey, but also confusion due to the dismissal of the membership 
(Redmond 2007: 307-308). 
 
This brings me to my first hypothesis:  
The best Turkey can hope for is to be offered a kind of special status or privileged 
membership of the EU due to its unfulfilment of the political conditions.  
 
The concept of interest in relation to this hypothesis is understanding. According 
to both Sannerstedt and Richardson, disagreement among member states about 
what the EU should be often leads to policies being vague and contradictive. 
Offering Turkey a special kind of membership can be seen as a peace treaty 
between memberstates that can not agree on what part Turkey should be allowed 
to take in the EU. As Richardson points out, difficulties for Turkey to understand 
what needs to be done in order to become a member and the disappointment about 
being rejected despite reforms that have been made, will lead to difficulties in the 
continued implementation process.  
EUs own indecisiveness can instead make Turkey turn away from the EU, as 
the few benefits from a special kind of membership are not worth the uncertainty 
about ever becoming a member. As Sannerstedt says, it is important that there is 
no misinterpretation between the implementer and the decision-maker, which EUs 
vacillation can finally result in. Also, there might be disagreement between 
Turkey and the EU about what reforms Turkey has implemented and what more 
needs to be done. These are factors that can come to influence the implementation 
process. 
3.2 The Public Doubt in the EU 
It is not only the political leaders that are in opposition of Turkey joining the 
prestigious club. The EU citizens are also seen as an obstacle to the admission 
(McLaren 2007: 252). The large scale immigration of Turks in Europe has led to 
resentment towards the Turks among EU citizens. Instead of empathy towards the 
country of origin of the migrants, many EU citizens see the immigration as a 
threat to in-group recourses and culture. This in turn manifests itself as opposition 
to Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership (McLaren 2007: 254). This is clearly 
the case for Austria and Germany, which have both received numerous Turkish 
immigrants. These are two of the strongest opposing countries to Turkey’s 
membership.  
This resentment goes back in European history when the “guest worker” 
program led to a large migration of Turks into Europe. In the 1960 Turks were 
able for the first time to get a passport and travel abroad. At the same time, 
Europe; especially Germany, was in need of labour. The deal was that when the 
economic boom declined and unemployment rose, these guest workers would 
have to return home. However, in reality it turned out differently with workers 
staying and also bringing over their families. A problem is that these groups have 
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had difficulties integrating into the European societies, which has led to concerns 
about Turkey’s accession to the EU. EU citizens fears that a Turkish membership 
will lead to additional migration which will produce hard-to-integrate minorities 
that will threaten social peace and stability (Teitelbaum, Martin 2003: 97). 
Once again I would like to point to the concept of understanding. According 
to Richardson, the parties should fully understand and agree on the objectives in 
order for implementation to be successful. In this case, in order to successfully 
enlarge the EU with Turkey, the government leaders need to allay the fears that 
have arisen due to migration by adopting measures. It is however most likely that 
the Turkish leaders will oppose such measures and have trouble excepting the fact 
that the EU may need some time to adjust to a full Turkish membership (McLaren 
2007: 274). This can also turn into a question of will. The EU citizens (as well as 
political leaders) resentment towards Turkey joining the EU can instead become a 
reason for Turkey to not join. It seems, however, unlikely that the accession talks 
will proceed either smoothly or quickly, and will therefore affect the Turkish 
implementation process.  
 
My second hypothesis will therefore be: 
The large scale migration of Turks in Europe and the problems it has created so 
far, e.g. difficulties with integrating into European societies, will be an obstacle 
for Turkeys possible membership and thereby also for a successful 
implementation of political reforms. 
3.3 Opposition in Turkey 
When it comes to the implementation of reforms, there are two opposing camps in 
Turkey. The “integralists” are in favour of a rapid implementation of all of the 
EUs required reforms. The “gradualists” also support accession to the EU, but 
favour a process of adaptation over a longer period of time. They also oppose 
some of the conditions attached to EU membership (Aydinli, Waxman 2001: 
384). One influential group in Turkey is the army, which is also divided between 
these two camps. Being so influential has led to a problematic situation, since the 
EU demands that the army obey under civilian control and thereby get less 
influence on Turkish politics (Phillips 2004: 86).   
The two opposing camps; but foremost the army, have become an obstacle for 
another condition set by the EU. This concerns increased minority rights for the 
Kurds. Since it is a highly sensitive issue in Turkey, this condition for 
membership has become controversial. While the integralists see it as a necessary 
step for membership, the gradualists refuse to back down from their negative 
stance on the issue (Aydinli, Waxman 2001: 384 -385). Due to this conflict 
between the parties, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been 
hindered in his pursuit of EU membership (Clarke 2006: 13). He has however, 
gone through with reforms such as economic liberalization and human rights 
protection. In addition he has made amendments in the constitution leading to 
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decreased power of the military. This has led to strong reactions among “army 
hard-liners” and other ultranationalists who do not want to give up prestige, 
privilege and power (Phillips 2004: 86). However, reducing the military’s power 
through Brussels will be much easier for Erdogans government, as well as other 
sensitive issues, which will be an incentive to keep striving for a EU membership 
(Yilmaz 2003: 10).  
One of the problems is that the army sees it self as a protector and promoter of 
the legacy of modern Turkey’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Atatürk 
created the Republic of Turkey, based on a vision of a modern state similar to its 
European neighbours. Westernization and secularism became the cornerstones of 
the Turkish state. The army deems it necessary to defend the state from threats 
such as separatism, terrorism and religious fundamentalism. Resistance among 
army members about granting the Kurds increased rights has to do with fears 
about “Kurdish separatism” (Phillips 2004: 86; Aydinli, Waxman 2001: 388).  
 
My third hypothesis will therefore be: 
Internal security concerns evoked by the Kurdish question will ultimately prevent 
Turkey from undertaking the reforms necessary for an EU membership, due to the 
many involved parties such as the army, PKK3 and nationalists.   
 
As long as there is opposition among different actors in Turkey to the 
demands of increased rights for the Kurds, there will be great difficulties for 
Erdogans government in implementing the political conditions. It will be 
especially hard to overlook the army’s point of view since they have such 
powerful influence. Here two concepts of implementation become interesting, 
ability and will. First, according to Richardson and Sannerstedt, the ability to 
implement a policy (or policies) can be prevented due to too many actors being 
involved in the process and that many of them do not accept the policy. Further, 
the division within different groups; such as the army, concerning this issue 
means that the government needs to control their agencies better in order to be 
able to go through with reforms. It needs to structure who is responsible of what.  
Second, it is a question of will. Like Sannerstedt ascertains, actors involved in 
the implementation process are guided by their own will to actually go through 
with a reform. As long as actors think there is a limit to what reforms Turkey 
should go through with, such as granting the Kurds increased rights, the Turkish 
government will have difficulties to go through with a full and successful 
implementation process. It is clear that the will to implement is affected by the 
parties’ values and opinions about how important the implementation actually is. 
For members of the army it is more important to prevent separatism and conflicts 
than granting Kurds more rights and thereby jeopardizing the stability and peace 
of the country. Also, according to both Sannerstedt and Richardson, in order for 
implementation to succeed the parties should have corresponding goals and 
interest. What I have written here shows that this might not be the case, especially 
not when it comes to the Kurdish question.  
                                               
3
 The Kurdistan Workers Party  
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4 Analysis of Hypotheses 
In this chapter I will make an analysis of what is said in Turkish and Swedish 
newsarticles about Turkey’s accession to the EU. This way I will be able to test 
my hypotheses and also see if my concepts of implementation are of any use when 
trying to explain what possible problems Turkey has. I will start by describing 
what is said in Turkish articles and thereby see if I get support or not for my 
hypotheses. After that I will do the same with the Swedish articles. I will also 
compare what is said in the Turkish and Swedish articles with each other. In my 
final chapter I will discuss my findings and present my conclusions.  
4.1 Turkish Newsarticles  
4.1.1 The Leading Opposition in the EU 
Lively discussions have been held in the EU concerning Turkey’s accession. In 
order to start negotiations about accession, a set of conditions and reservations 
was set, which had not been the case with previous candidate countries. These 
conditions have to do with the member states not being able to agree on whether 
or not Turkey should be able to join at all. But since the EU has already said yes, 
these conditions are a way of halting the process. Opposing states such as France, 
Germany and Austria have instead called for something else rather than a full 
membership. The French President Nicolas Sarkozy is strongly against Turkish 
accession. According to him Turkey does not belong to Europe (“The EU and 
Turkey 3 years on” December 12, 2007 Today’s Zaman; “Turkish reservations 
about EU relations” November 22, 2007 Turkish Daily News). Despite the support 
by other EU members; such as Great Britain and Sweden, these were not able to 
make the union renew its promise to let Turkey join. This is seen by Turkey as a 
betrayal, and France resistance will block future relations between the two 
countries (“Tüsiad: French objection to Turkey pathological” December 12, 2007 
Today’s Zaman; “Annoyed Turkey to keep diplomatic pressure on EU” December 
12, 2007 Turkish Daily News).  
Religion is one of the obstacles to Turkey’s accession. Many Turks feel that 
Christian values have become a criteria for EU membership and that Turkey can 
not become a member due to cultural and spiritual differences (“Christian Values: 
New EU Membership Criteria for Turkey?” September 23, 2006 Journal of 
Turkish Weekly; “Merkel insists on ‘privileged partnership’ for Turkey” 
September 25, 2004 Turkish Daily News).   
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An interesting point that needs to be made is Turkeys own religious 
discrimination towards non-Muslims. Although Islam might not be a restriction 
towards Turkey’s membership, Turkey’s own restriction on religious freedom 
might be (“Religion at heart of debate over Turkey’s EU bid” September 26, 2004 
Turkish Daily News). Even though Turkey has made improvements such as 
making amendments in the constitution concerning religious minorities, there are 
still reports that indicate crimes against human rights, such as religion. 
Between the political parties; even within the parties, in the EU there are also 
different opinions on the matter. In 2004 just before the EU commission was to 
release a progress report dealing with Turkey’s accession, the EU parliament was 
divided (“Erdogan meeting heats up Turkey debate in European Parliament” 
September 25, 2004 Turkish Daily News).  
When reading the Turkish articles I find partial support for my first 
hypothesis. Many of the articles deal with the debate between EU member states 
about whether or not Turkey should be able to join the Union. It is this 
disagreement, rather than Turkey’s unfulfilment of the political conditions, 
together with France strong opposition that has led to discussions about a special 
kind of membership. This gives evidence to Sannerstedts and Richardson’s theory 
that agreements within the EU often are ‘peace treaties’. This might lead to 
confusion in Turkey about what reforms they need to go through with. While this 
shows that the concept of understanding is useful I believe that the newsarticles 
shows that the concept of will is more useful. Turkey’s history with the EU shows 
that this is not the first time Turkey has been let down by promises made by the 
EU. It also shows that Turkey has turned its back towards the EU in an attempt to 
show that the EU is not indispensable for Turkey. While Turkey have made 
reforms and comprehends what the EU asks of it, it is equally important for 
Turkey to be able to show the EU that they in turn also can set some demands. 
The only thing actually supporting Turkey’s problems with the political 
conditions is the discrimination of non-Muslim religion. 
How the EU handles Turkey’s application for membership will come to set the 
course for future candidate countries. If religion comes to be a determinant, it will 
jeopardize EUs relationship with potentially important new members. It will also 
endanger relations with non-members bordering the EU as well as with Muslim 
countries in the east; countries the EU needs to stay on good terms with for 
economic and security reasons. Religious discrimination does not go hand in hand 
with the fundamentals upon which the EU is built.  
However, it is important not to forget the problems Turkey have with the 
acceptance of non-Muslim religions. While it is easy to criticize the EU of being a 
strict ‘Christian club’, Turkey needs to deal with national religious issues as well. 
One critique towards Turkey is the lack of respect for human rights, which 
includes respect for religious minorities.  
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4.1.2 The Public Doubt in the EU 
Except for political leaders there is a widespread opinion among EU citizens that 
Turkey should not be able to join. One reason for Turkey’s bad image is the large 
Muslim communities living in Europe, which have failed to integrate into the new 
society. The fear of these communities trying to “Islamify” Europe has led to the 
EU citizens doubting the suitability of letting a predominantly Muslim Turkey 
join. In order to tackle this, the Turkish government needs to realize and handle its 
image problem (“Winning the heart of EU citizens will be an uphill battle” 
September 26, 2007 Today’s Zaman). 
Actions committed by radical Islamists in Europe, like the bombings in 
Madrid and London, have also made people doubt Islam’s compatibility with 
European values (“Turkey And Europe’s Problem With Radical Islam” November 
6, 2005 Journal of Turkish Weekly).  
Actions outside of Europe such as the cartoon controversy and the subsequent 
reactions in the Muslim world gave further weight to Europeans fears and the 
growing polarization between Europeans and Muslims. This will most likely lead 
to further hostility between host societies and Muslim immigrants, which also will 
strengthen the opposition to a Turkish membership in the EU (“Turkey’s 
impending disorientation” February 7, 2006 Turkish Daily News).  
The question of letting a Muslim and culturally different country join the EU 
also became an electoral question in the EU referendum, where a no vote from the 
European citizens also would be considered a no to Turkish accession (“As 
French EU vote draws near, Turkey grows restless” May 22, 2005 Turkish Daily 
News). 
Overall, the common opinion in Europe is that Turkey is too big to be 
digested, too poor and too different from the rest of Europe. A membership would 
mean the EU problems would increase as well as the member’s economic and 
political burden (“If Turkey Says No?” August 22, 2005 Journal of Turkish 
Weekly).  
There is however mutual influence between the public and its leaders on the 
opinions about a Turkish membership. The politicians inform the citizens about 
factors that can create a negative image of the Turks (“Fall may bring tension in 
Turkish-EU relations, says consultant” July 21, 2006 Turkish Daily News). 
Politicians and state leaders on the other hand cannot disregard the public opinion. 
Either way, it will be difficult for Turkey to counteract this negativity (“Hot 
autumn descends fast on Turkey-EU relations” September 10, 2006 Turkish Daily 
News).  
My second hypothesis is to some extent confirmed. Turkish immigrants failing 
to integrate have led to the European citizens doubting Turkeys place in the EU 
and therefore opposing a membership. Both the EU and the Turkish government 
need to adopt measures in order to alleviate Europeans fears of letting Turkey 
join. Such measures might be difficult for groups in Turkey to agree to which can 
affect the implementation process.  
 However, the main fear seems to be that a membership of a Muslim country 
would lead to further immigration of Muslims and there are concerns of what this 
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would imply. I think that here it becomes most useful with the concept of will. As 
Richardson points out, sometimes it is not the implementation that is not working 
but rather the policy being ineffective. A problem can be inadequately understood 
and also how it is best solved. In this case, the Europeans fears of Muslim 
communities have also led to believing that since Turkey is predominantly 
Muslim it does not fit in the EU. A membership would only bring more trouble to 
Europe. What is forgotten in all of this is that actions threatening culture, peace 
and stability have to do with certain groups and not Islam (“Turkey And Europe’s 
Problem With Radical Islam” November 6, 2005 Journal of Turkish Weekly). The 
reason for the present situation is not Turkey’s EU membership. 
 Even though many Muslims in Europe face social barriers to integration, a 
problem can also be how the receiving state handles immigrants. Germany is an 
example that due to laws, immigrants face significant difficulties in assimilating 
to the new society.  
The solution in Turkey’s case would therefore not be exclusion but rather 
inclusion in the EU. By encouraging Turkey’s EU membership religious 
tendencies can be prevented. Instead Europe could learn from its cooperation with 
a Muslim Turkey (“If Turkey Says No?” August 22, 2005 Journal of Turkish 
Weekly). The encouragement will most likely also lead to a more successful 
implementation process in Turkey, since there is a better understanding between 
the two parties about what the underlying problems are for a membership. It will 
be easier for Turkey to come to an insight of what needs to be done in order to 
join the EU. If the EU can accept the differences between Islamic Turkey and the 
rest of Europe it will be easier for Turkey to go through with the reforms.  
4.1.3 Opposition in Turkey 
One of the critical issues in Turkey’s EU membership bid is the political influence 
of the Army. This can be linked to two major challenges for Turkey: Political 
Islam and Kurdish nationalism (“Turkey’s Political Conflicts and the EU’s 
Involvement – 2007” May 5, 2006 Journal of Turkish Weekly). Nationalists have 
strongly criticized Prime Minister Erdogans acceptance of Kurds defining 
themselves as a distinct ethnic group in Turkey. They think that Erdogan is 
questioning the “one Turkish nation” policy and that a separate Kurdish identity 
can lead to a divide of the state along ethnic lines (“Erdogan’s remarks on Kurdish 
identity stir debate over Turkey’s national identity” November 30, 2005 Turkish 
Daily News).  
The Turkish army is concerned about the political reforms needed in order to 
become a member of the EU. It fears that the reforms will increase Kurds cultural 
and political rights which will lead to separatism (“Lynching psychology thrives 
on Kurdish question and bad governance” September 18, 2006 Turkish Daily 
News).  
Despite attempts to improve the situation not all parties involved seem to want 
to resolve the question, which has led to continued violence. This means that the 
goal of full cultural and political rights for the Kurds is unobtainable. It also 
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means weakened support by the EU (“Trouble in the South-East: Will the 
Reformers Please Stand up?” April 4, 2006 Today’s Zaman).  
In order to reach a solution The Turkish government needs to start by 
guaranteeing the rule of law (“Trouble in the South-East: Will the Reformers 
Please Stand up?” April 4, 2006 Today’s Zaman). A first step would be to make 
the army obey under strict civilian control, which is also a necessary condition for 
a membership in the EU. This has become a test for the EU in order to see if the 
army can respect the democratic arrangement of civil military relations (“Turkey: 
We want no military coup!” April 29, 2007 Journal of Turkish Weekly).  
In 1984 members of PKK took up arms for autonomy (“Erdogan’s remarks on 
Kurdish identity stir debate over Turkey’s national identity” November 30, 2005 
Turkish Daily News). But as the Turkish state is becoming more democratic, the 
PKK needs to do the same. They should give up their armed struggle and turn to 
peaceful dialogue instead (“Trouble in the South-East: Will the Reformers Please 
Stand up?” April 4, 2006 Today’s Zaman). However, none of this has become 
reality. The PKK has been able to pursue its separatist movement due to the 
Turkish government non-comprehensive approach on the Kurdish question 
(“PACE Criticizes Turkey’s Methods of Combating Terrorism” September 5, 
2006 Today’s Zaman). Even though there have been amendments in the law, the 
military remains strong and keep pursuing attacks against the PKK. A hope was 
that the Turkish Europeanization would bring a solution to the Kurdish question. 
When the PKK declared the end of the cease fire in 2004 it became evident that 
Turkey’s approach to the EU was of no help (“Turkey’s Political Conflicts and the 
EU’s Involvement – 2007” May 5, 2006 Journal of Turkish Weekly).  
The information presented in the articles clearly support my third hypotheses. 
It also becomes clear that my concepts ability and will have been useful. There are 
different opinions in Turkey about granting the Kurds increased rights. While the 
government tries to push for reforms in this question, nationalist, foremost the 
army resists such attempts. These groups fear that Turkey will be divided along 
ethnical lines and that there are great risks of Kurdish separatism. Their fears have 
been confirmed by their neighbouring country Iraq where Kurds now control a 
region in the North. As long as the army believe that it is the political reforms 
imposed due to the EU accession process, it will be difficult for the government to 
keep pursuing them. The Kurdish question is so deeply rooted that it will be 
difficult to come to a solution any time soon. For some it is not worth jeopardizing 
peace and stability for. There are simply too many wills in order to enforce 
practical steps towards increased cultural and political rights for the Kurds. 
Important to notice in the articles are if it is really just the army’s will that is 
preventing a solution to the Kurdish question. It is clear that the army has been 
able to take advantage of the government’s passivity and difficulty to come up 
with a stable solution as well as the PKK’s provocative attempts to ignore the few 
attempts by Erdogan to reach a solution. The fact the government has not yet 
reached a stable solution might indicate that they also fear separatism or that they 
simply do not have the capacity to go against the army or the PKK.   
In order to reach a solution, all parties involved needs to have the same goals 
and interests. Maybe opposition groups should reconsider. Instead of excluding 
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the Kurds and thereby encourage separatist feelings, the Kurds should be granted 
more cultural and political rights. By giving the Kurds a voice and a stake in 
Turkish political life, maybe the outcome will be the opposite. Instead of seeking 
independence the Kurds wants to belong to Turkey and be loyal citizens (“Trouble 
in the South-East: Will the Reformers Please Stand up?” April 4, 2006 Today’s 
Zaman). An important step in this is to move closer to the EU which provides a 
chance for further reforms in this question. 
  
4.2 Swedish Newsarticles 
4.2.1 The Leading Opposition in the EU 
Swedish articles put emphasis on who oppose Turkish accession and who does 
not. Already in 2004 there was mentioning of a ‘privileged partnership’ instead of 
full membership for Turkey. (“Islamofobi problem för Turkiet i EU” December 
14, 2004 Sydsvenskan).  
The strongest opponent is the French President Nicolas Sarkozy who has made 
it clear that Turkey does not belong in Europe. Since each EU state has the right 
to veto against a new member, the French opposition can be the main obstacle for 
Turkey’s membership bid (“Nu blir det strid om Turkiet” May 9, 2007 
Sydsvenskan).  
There are great tensions in the EU between countries that whish to enlarge the 
EU and their opponents. Sarkozy has taken the initiative to start a “group of wise 
men” whose assignment will be to come up with ideas about the future of the EU. 
Sarkozy’s actual goal for this group was to draw the borders of Europe future 
expansion. Germany and Austria support this line of thought (“Turkiet huvudvärk 
för EU” December 14, 2007 Dagens Nyheter). Countries like Sweden, Italy and 
Great Britain however refused this suggestion since it would mean an exclusion of 
Turkey from the Union (“Sarkozy: Turkiet i Asien, inte i EU” November 13, 2007 
Sydsvenskan). Instead they want the EU to respect its previous commitments to 
Turkey. The controversy over the Turkish issue has led to a fundamental conflict 
between the two views on the future of the EU (“Hårdhänta prov väntar EU-
länderna” December 12, 2007 Svenska Dagbladet).  
The main arguments of those who believe that Turkey does not belong in 
Europe are the EUs limited ability to absorb such a large country as well as the 
protection of Europe’s identity. This has resulted in decreased enthusiasm among 
Turks about joining the EU. There is a great risk that the reform process will slow 
down or even stop if it becomes evident that the promises about a membership 
were false. As a result, radical forces of Islam can take advantage of the situation. 
It will also send out signals to the Muslim world that Islam can not be combined 
with democracy (“Grattis, Europa!” March 25, 2007 Sydsvenskan; “EU kräver att 
Turkiet förändrar åsiktslag” November 6, 2007 Svenska Dagbladet; “Befogad 
kritik mot Turkiet” October 31, 2006 Sydsvenskan). Turkey feels that France is 
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trying to bloc future membership talks with the EU. Instead they urge the 
importance of both parties keeping confidence in each other (“Frankrike krockar 
med Turkiet i EU” June 26, 2007 Dagens Nyheter). 
Just like the Turkish newsarticles, the Swedish give support to my first 
hypothesis that the best Turkey can hope for is a privileged membership. The 
reason put forward is not so much Turkey’s unfulfilment of the political 
conditions. It is rather the disagreement about the EUs enlargement which has not 
led to discussions about a privileged membership, as the Turkish articles show, 
but to conflicts between the member states.  
The disagreement between the states has made Turkey doubt EUs honesty 
about a membership. This has led to less enthusiasm among the Turks and also a 
chance for more radical religious groups to take advantage of the situation. This 
corresponds well with my findings and analysis from the Turkish articles. The 
concept of will becomes useful since Turks feel that the aim of becoming a 
member of a club that it is not welcomed into has its limits. This will, I believe, 
hinder a continued implementation process and even less a successful one.  
Like the Turkish articles show, it is also a question of understanding since it 
has become difficult for Turkey to believe in a membership since not even the EU 
can agree on its future enlargement strategy. This will lead to difficulties in 
Turkey’s implementation of political reforms. It is most likely that the 
disagreement has led to the new membership conditions set for Turkey. But to 
empirically prove this will be difficult. It is important to remember that the 
demands also increase for other states applying, not only Turkey. As the EU 
becomes more and more established and a stronger actor internationally it can also 
afford to raise its demands. Despite states like Sweden and Britain that are in 
favour of future enlargements, the EUs protectionism will make it hard for new 
states to live up to the growing demands.  
4.2.2 The Public Doubt in the EU 
The Swedish articles show that a large part of the French, German and the 
Austrian population are sceptic about Turkey joining. The main reasons are that 
the religious and cultural differences are too big (“Islamofobi problem för Turkiet 
i EU” December 14, 2004 Sydsvenskan). According to many, Turkey does not fit 
into a Christian Europe. In addition, an obstacle for Turkey will be to get accepted 
by the EU countries which suffer from low growth and instable welfare system. 
Europeans fear increased competition from Turks on the already competitive 
labour market. Turkey does not have the political will to take part of the European 
integration project. Seeing that it is too large it will get the institutional system of 
the EU out of balance (“Signerat” September 29, 2005 Dagens Nyheter; “Ingen 
rädder för turken här” March 28, 2007 Sydsvenskan). Although one of these 
articles was printed in 2005, I believe this to still be a problem. New member 
countries still face though conditions on the labour market as well as instable 
welfare systems. Considering the fact that many Turks already reside in Europe 
there is a general fear that a Turkish membership will increase the migration and 
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thereby also the competition. In 2007 it is reconfirmed since there is still popular 
opposition to letting a relatively poor Muslim country join (“Grattis, Europa!” 
March 25, 2007 Sydsvenskan).  
France and Austria have declared that they will take a popular vote the day 
Turkey fulfils all the membership conditions. However, this could destroy the 
dream of a politically unified Europe, since the French strongly oppose the 
Turkish membership. To them it would be a slap in the face to even have to vote 
about it (“Lång väg till EU för Turkiet” October 4, 2005 Dagens Nyheter). The 
French have already declared their resistance to a Turkish membership by voting 
no to the new EU constitution (“Nu blir det strid om Turkiet” May 9, 2007 
Sydsvenskan).  
In Sweden, one of the few countries in support of the Turkish membership, 
most of the political parties agree on this subject. However, the public opinion is 
another. In 2007, a survey showed that only 10 percent were in favour of a 
Turkish membership. However, the question is whether this applies to the notion 
that Turkey would become a member today or in the future. It is however 
interesting to see how there has come to be a gap between the public and the 
politicians regarding Turkey and the EU (“Massiv opinion mot turkiskt 
medlemskap” May 8, 2007 Svenska Dagbladet).  
As opposed to the Turkish articles, the Swedish does not mention the Turks 
that already reside in Europe. However, considering the fact that most of the 
Turkish immigrants in Europe reside in France, Germany and Austria it is most 
likely that this has affected the public opinion about a Turkish membership. 
Neither do the Swedish articles mention anything about the possible impact on the 
public opinion of the terrorist actions taken by radical Muslims. The main focus is 
simply that Turkey does not fit in Europe due to religious and economic reasons, 
which also can be read in the Turkish articles.  
As the scientific articles show the European citizens are afraid that 
immigration will threaten in-group recourses and culture, which both the Swedish 
and Turkish articles confirm. Like I reasoned with the Turkish articles, the 
question is whether this is because of the Turks already living in Europe or the 
possibility of this happening due to an increase of Turkish immigrants if (when) 
they become members.  
What use then do I have of my concepts of implementation? My line of 
argument when I analysed the Turkish newsarticles with the help of my second 
hypothesis, also applies to the Swedish articles. It is a question of will, since 
Europeans fears of Islam have made them reject a Turkish membership. But it is 
simply not just religion. I would like to add the economic aspect, that Turkey is 
too big and too poor, which also makes it a question of ability. The EU asks too 
much too soon which has become unfair in Turkey’s case. Previous candidate 
countries, such as Poland, were able to join in order to be able to improve 
democracy and its economy. For Turkey, these conditions have to be fulfilled in 
order to become a member. It can therefore become a resource problem. As I 
mentioned earlier, it becomes more and more difficult for new applicants to join 
the EU. Ever since it became clear that a membership in the EU was possible, 
Turkey has strongly pursued political reforms in order to live up to the political 
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conditions. The development has been quite rapid. However, during recent years 
Turkey has dealt with the critique saying the implementation process has slowed 
down. Maybe the EU needs to realize that pushing so hard for reforms also needs 
encouragement as well as practical support. Turkey has gotten neither, and maybe 
this is a reason why they face difficulties with the continued implementation 
process? What is forgotten are the reforms Turkey has actually gone through with. 
Should they not get any credit for that? In order to get a little you have got to give 
a little. For Turkey to be able to continue its implementation of political reforms, 
the EU should live up to the expectations of its promise of one day letting Turkey 
become a member.  
4.2.3 Opposition in Turkey 
Just like the Turkish articles showed, the main obstacle in trying to solve the 
Kurdish question in Turkey is the strong influence of the military. Already in 
2004 the army warned about a Kurdish region in Iraq, which would inspire the 
Kurds in Turkey to demand their own cultural and political rights (“Turkiet varnar 
för kurdstyrd region i Irak” January 17, 2004 Sydsvenskan).  
The Kurdish question has become highly disputed within Turkey. Except for 
the army, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said it would be 
unacceptable with a Kurdish federal state (“Turkiet är inte redo ännu” October 4, 
2005 Svenska Dagbladet). 
 Erdogan’s government is torn between the military and the EU. As part of the 
Europeanization process Erdogan has promised to solve the Kurdish question 
through democratic reforms. A first step has been to allow the Kurds limited 
language and cultural rights. This has become highly problematic since he has to 
stay on good terms with the army, who oppose such reforms. The army also 
doubts Erdogans real intentions because of his Islamic background. To add to the 
tension is the EUs demand to limit the power of the Turkish army (“Kurdfrågan 
på väg att lösas” August 12, 2005 Dagens Nyheter).  
Before the election in 2007 the Kurdish question was a very sensitive issue. 
The army wanted the government to give its support to a military attack towards 
the PKK in northern Iraq. For many Kurds this was just a way for the military to 
stir up nationalistic feelings in Turkey. But for Erdogan it was a difficult decision 
since he could risk the votes of many Kurds and also the possible membership in 
the EU (“Ett viktigt val för alla kurder” July 13, 2007 Sydsvenskan).  An invasion 
of Iraq, which is occupied by the USA, can also lead to further problems such as a 
conflict with Turkey’s closest ally: the USA (“Turkisk opposition för Irak-
invasion” January 14, 2007 Sydsvenskan).  
Many believe that the Turkish military attacks against PKK in Iraq are only an 
excuse for preventing the Kurds from gaining more independence. It is also a way 
for the army to keep control of the situation considering that the AKP has 
improved the situation for the Kurds and moving Turkey closer to the EU. It is 
however important to remember that even if the PKK gets eliminated, the problem 
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of Kurdish oppression still remains (“Kurderna skräms av krigshetsen” October 
10, 2007 Dagens Nyheter). 
The Swedish newsarticles give strong support to my third hypothesis. Just like 
the Turkish articles showed, the main obstacle is the fear of the Turkish army that 
the Kurds will gain more rights. The main focus is Erdogans difficulties with both 
pleasing the army and at the same time increasing the Kurdish rights as to please 
the Kurds and the EU. There is a slightly different tone in the Swedish articles 
however. The Turkish articles imply that the army remains strong and can keep 
pursue its attacks towards the PKK because the Turkish government has not been 
able to come up with a stable solution. The Swedish articles indicate that the army 
keep pursuing its attacks because it is starting to fear the reforms the Erdogan 
government has made when it comes to Kurdish rights and thereby increasing 
Turkey’s chances of getting into the EU.  
Despite this, there still remain difficulties in the implementation process due 
to different actors opposing reforms. Just like with the Turkish articles, the 
concepts of ability and will help explain Turkeys problems with implementation. I 
would like to add a little to my reasoning. As long as there are actors who oppose 
reforms it will be difficult for Erdogan to keep pursuing them. Part of the 
implementation problem is state institutions which oppose granting Kurds cultural 
and political rights. When it comes to the army it is highly difficult to see how 
Erdogan can best solve the problem. The army believes that an EU membership 
will reduce its role and power and one of the EUs demands for membership is to 
reduce the role of the army in Turkish politics. Except for the army, the Swedish 
articles also show  
When it comes to the army I find their stance a little contradictive. On one 
hand they see themselves as the protector of the legacy from Atatürk. On the other 
they counteract attempts made by Turkey in trying to westernize and come closer 
to its European neighbours, which were the goals of Atatürk.   
 
  24
5 Conclusion 
Considering the difficulties Turkey is facing when trying to become a member in 
the EU, I found it of interest to elucidate what the main problem is. The EU has 
on several occasions made it clear that the main obstacle for a Turkish 
membership is Turkey’s failure in implementing the necessary political reforms. 
The purpose with this essay has therefore been to analyse why it is Turkey has 
such problems when it comes to the implementation of these reforms.  
By testing the hypotheses with the help of my concepts of implementation I 
have been able to come up with different explanations. To some extent I have 
been able to confirm my hypotheses but the Turkish and Swedish newsarticles 
also widens the perspective a little. At the same time it has become evident that 
there is little difference in how Turkey’s case is presented in the Turkish and 
Swedish articles. The conclusions I draw when doing my analysis of the 
hypotheses are therefore much alike. 
When it comes to hypothesis one, both the Swedish and Turkish articles show 
that due to Turkeys size and religion, EU member states can not agree on whether 
or not Turkey should be able to join. This does not necessarily mean that the best 
thing Turkey can hope for is something like a ‘privileged membership’ since 
states such as Sweden and Great Britain believe that Turkey should be promised 
nothing else than a full membership. The disagreement does automatically not 
lead to difficulties for Turkey when it comes to the implementation, it is however 
an indication that this might be the case. To answer my question, with the help of 
the concept of understanding it can be interpreted that it will be difficult for 
Turkey to comprehend what is necessary in order to please the EU and will 
thereby effect the implementation process. However, it can also be that Turkey 
chooses to stop the reform process deliberately because a membership seems 
impossible as long as powerful countries such as Germany and France oppose it. 
Thereby the Turkish and Swedish articles also showed that the concept of will 
became useful. Even though it does not answer my question it gives an 
apprehension of why Turkey has become such a problematic candidate to the EU.  
The Turkish articles support hypothesis two, indicating that the Turkish 
migrants in Europe have led to the European public opposing the membership. I 
have therefore had use of the concept of understanding since both the EU states as 
well as Turkey needs to take measures in order to make Turkey more appealing. 
This however might be difficult in Turkey since not all actors are in favour of 
such measures. However, the Swedish and Turkish articles indicate that it is rather 
the fear of further immigration, than the already existing one, that is seen as a 
threat to many Europeans. It therefore becomes a question of will, since this fear 
is most likely based on a prejudice against Islam as a religion and not Turkey. 
This can give a possible answer to my question since the demands set by the EU 
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have to do with how the politicians are affected by the public opinion on the issue. 
Many, both within Turkey and in the EU, are of the opinion that these demands 
are higher than with previous candidates. Except for religion it is also an 
economic aspect which makes the concept of ability useful. The extra set of 
criteria applied to Turkey makes it more difficult for Turkey to go through with a 
successful implementation.  
As the two first hypotheses deals with external forces that influence Turkey in 
its implementation process, the third hypothesis deals with internal obstacles such 
as the army. According to both the Turkish and Swedish articles, concerns among 
different groups in Turkey about increased rights for the Kurds has made it 
difficult for Erdogan to go through with reforms necessary for an EU 
membership. This confirms that the concepts of will and ability have been useful 
when analysing why Turkey has problems with the implementation of reforms 
because of the Kurdish question. Important has also been the fact about how 
Erdogans Islamic background has become an additional obstacle when trying to 
make the army cooperate; an army that governs the secular heritage of Turkey. As 
long as the army is suspicious about Erdogans real intentions with his leadership, 
it will probably be almost impossible to make the army agree to reforms that 
limits their power but increases the Kurds.  
When it comes to the concepts of implementation I have found the concept of 
understanding difficult to apply to Turkey’s situation. Even though I have found 
the concept useful, in order to see if disagreements have led to vague policies and 
in turn difficulties in Turkey’s implementation process, my answers only become 
more of assumptions. In Turkey’s case the concepts of will and ability has been 
most useful, because in the end it all comes down to what or/and how many actors 
take part in the implementation process, and if they are willing to go through with 
it.  
In order to be able to fully use all three concepts – ability, understanding and 
will – the research needs to be done on an actor and administrative level. That is 
why I find hypothesis three to give the most satisfying answer to my question. 
However, I am of the opinion that all of my hypotheses together with the help of 
my concepts of implementation have increased our understanding of Turkey’s 
problems with implementation and thereby why it faces difficulties in its strive 
towards an EU membership.  
It is said that no one has pushed so hard for political reforms as Erdogan. Even 
so, he still faces strong opposition pulling in the other direction. The solution is 
not to please both the EU and the national opposition groups. If Turkey is to 
become a member, the EU needs to take into consideration what reforms that have 
already been made. Important is also for Erdogan to keep up the implementation 
process, but in order to do that the promise of full membership needs to be 
obtainable in the nearest future. 
By the end of the day the EU needs to ask itself if it actually wants Turkey to 
join or not. The question is why the EU at one point in 2004 agreed to start 
membership negotiations and why today some countries oppose it and therefore 
find different ways to prolong the process? My conclusion is that the EU is not 
able to reach homogeneous agreements and has trouble sticking to promises. I 
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believe that this will remain a problem as long as member states are too 
influenced by questions relating to domestic policies. This is the case when it 
comes to Germany, France and Austria with large Turkish communities. While 
these state leaders deem it necessary to keep Turkey close for security reasons 
they also fear what the repercussions will be if the go against the common will of 
the public opinion.   
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